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HONORS CAPSTONE ABSTRACT
This research tests whether minorities are underrepresented in state legislatures due to restrictive
state election laws that hinder voting. Some states like Oregon make it easier for citizens to vote
and other states like Texas make it more difficult. The Cost of Voting Index (COVI) is a
measurement of the electoral/institutional restrictiveness of each state and values are available
for presidential election years from 1996 to 2020. Previous research has revealed that the amount
of voting restrictions that citizens face makes it harder for them to vote (Li, Pomante
Schraufnagel, 2018). What is less understood is whether restrictions hurt Blacks and Latinos
running for statewide offices. This research will test whether the COVI can help predict voting
margins, which in turn will reveal how successful minority candidates will be in states that are
less restrictive or more restrictive. Broadly, the purpose of this research is to understand the
electoral success of minorities and how the COVI helps to explain their success. Most
specifically, the research question I examine is, does the restrictiveness of each state’s
electoral/institutional climate help explain the relative underrepresentation of minorities in
government? In other words, can the restrictiveness of state election laws help explain a lack of
representation of Blacks and Latinos in elected offices?
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Introduction
Aside from voter turnout, at either the aggregate or individual level, I look to examine the
electoral success of minority candidates who run for public office. What are the possibilities that
minority candidates will win when they run? But I am also looking into whether lower election
margins connect to being a minority candidate? In attempting to address these questions with
state-wide election Cost of Voting Index (COVI) values, there are limitations. For instance, I do
not have the values for individual House districts in the United States. However, when
candidates run for a US House seat in an at-large race, or when the entire state is a single House
district, I can use COVI values to efficiently measure minority electoral achievement1. There are
also other statewide offices, such as Governor and Senator, where the electoral constituency is
the entire state, which is convenient. These offices, along with other statewide elected offices,
serve as my primary testing grounds.
Nevertheless, the COVI values can be used in numerous ways to test how they may
influence minority political representation in state legislatures. For instance, I can test how each
state legislature in the country stacks up when it comes to representing minority citizens,
descriptively. Is it true that states with lower COVI values have a higher proportion of minorities
in their chambers? It is reasonable to assume that states with more inclusive electoral systems
would produce state lawmakers who look more like their state residents. I am aware that some
state assemblies are more amateur or part-time affairs, and that these chambers are more elite
bodies with lower descriptive representation (Squire 1992). What about the state's electoral and
institutional climate? After controlling for legislative professionalism, can COVI values help
explain variations in the descriptive representation of state legislatures? In answering this

1

In 2021, there are seven at large House districts. A single representative in the US House of Representatives is
elected from Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.
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question, I also have the opportunity to test for a relationship between state COVI values and the
proportional representation of women, another subpopulation that is notably underrepresented in
state elected offices throughout the United States (Squire 1992).
Minorities, the COVI, and Electoral Success
In all, I have several different ways to test each state’s electoral and institutional climate
against minority electoral success. In the first set of tests, I examine candidates running for
statewide offices. In certain states, using packing as a gerrymandering tactic has improved
minority candidate electoral success. Especially when gerrymandering has resulted in majorityminority districts (Nelson 2019). However, the COVI values differentiate between states rather
than legislative districts within a state. To address this modeling issue, I must limit my analysis
of electoral performance to minority candidates running for statewide offices. I have specifically
collected statistics on all minorities who run for governor, senator, lieutenant governor (when
running alone), at-large House races, and other offices within the plural executive of state
governments such as attorney general, treasurer, and secretary of state. I also examine all
statewide races from 1996 to 2020 and include only minorities who run as candidates of one of
the two major political parties. Third-party candidates are already at a disadvantage
(Schraufnagel 2011) and including them in the analysis would confuse the test of minority
electoral success.
Primarily, I have three unique dependent variables that test the electoral success of
minority candidates who run for statewide office. The first component is a dummy variable that
is scored "1" if a minority candidate Won Office and "0" if the candidate loses the statewide
election. I expect a higher state COVI value to be associated with zeros, so the logistical
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regression I run is expected to have a negative coefficient.2 Second, I examine whether COVI
values, along with other control variables, can predict a minority candidate's Own Percentage or
the percentage of total votes earned. Third, I use the same model except this time the Election
Margin is the dependent variable. Candidates who do not win will now obtain a negative value.
All three factors are linked, and the last two may appear to be perfectly correlated.
However, not all statewide elections have just two candidates, so the third test takes this into
account by testing the difference in vote percentages for the winning major party candidate and
the major party minority candidate. Assuming a minority candidate wins 40% of the vote but
loses, in one instance, the winning candidate would have won 60% of the vote, and the minority
candidate's election margin would be -20% (40 – 60). In another instance, the winner might have
received 45 percent of the vote, with the minority candidate receiving 40 percent and a thirdparty candidate receiving 15 percent. The minority election margin is now -5 percent. (40 - 45).
The assumption is that the minority candidate did better in the second case than they did in the
first example presented.
Consider Kamala Harris (D), a Black woman who ran for Attorney General of California
against Steve Cooley (R) in 2010. This exemplifies the three measurement strategies. Four minor
party candidates ran in this election as well. Mr. Cooley received 45.21% of the vote, while Ms.
Harris received 46.05% of the vote. Ms. Harris is clearly given a "1" in the first model since she
won. In the second model, she gets a score of "46.05," which represents her vote percentage. In
the third case, she earns a score of ".84" (46.05% - 45.21%), which is equivalent to her winning
vote margin. In the first example, Harris' vote percentage would show a loss of 7.9%, which is

2

Logistical regression is most appropriate when the dependent variable is dichotomous or only takes on
two unique values such as “0” and “1.” The idea is to convert the “0’s” and “1’s” to odds ratios and then
to use calculus to convert these further, using the constant “e,” to create an interval level measure that can
then be used in a regression model (Menard,2011).
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not accurate because she won. I anticipate a negative correlation between state COVI values and
each of the three dependent variables, or measures of minority electoral support. I conducted the
three experiments in the spirit of empirical inquiry, which aims to understand how stable a
relationship between two concepts is and to determine if a statistical relationship can withstand
several model specifications. Each model run reflects at least one, if not more, distinct
assumptions.
The Volume of Minority Candidates.
Before I begin, the tests of the electoral success of minority candidates who run for
statewide office, I would like to see if minorities are less likely to run for public office in general.
Given the long history of White male domination in electoral politics in the United States, I
suspect that many capable minority individuals would simply not run for public office.
Recognizing that the country's electoral climate is not favorable to electoral success, especially in
certain states, many reasonable individuals would simply refuse to run. This degree of
demobilization is especially concerning because it reflects a level of political alienation, that
would almost certainly result in less minority representation in elected political offices.
To assess minority demobilization, I simply calculated the number of times a minority
candidate might have ran in a governor's election, a US Senate race, or an at-large House race
between 1996 to 2020. In total, 870 opportunities were available, with 59 minority candidates
running during this time period. Alternatively, 6.78 % (59/870) of all candidates for public office
represent one of the two largest minority groups in America. This is significantly less than the
proportion of those two populations in any year between 1996 to 2020. Based on the estimated
data from the U.S. Census Bureau, 28% of the U.S. population was either black or Latinx. That
is why I get around a 21% difference (28-6.78). This generally suggests that minorities are

Hill 6

descriptively under-represented in US politics even before any elections are held, because there
are simply fewer minority candidates. However, I believe that this is the case in some states
rather than others, and I can test this. For this reason, I want to know in particularly the role
played by a restrictive electoral state climate or higher COVI values.
I know the average education and income of members of the two largest minority groups
in the U.S. is lower than other Americans. I have noticed, in particular, that when controlling for
education and income the voter turnout of Blacks is in fact higher than the voter turnout of
Whites. One could imagine that lack of minorities in public office can be justified by an
educational attainment or income level on average. The possible disadvantages experienced by
minorities in seeking to achieve similar political standing in a predominantly white country are in
a large way responsible for this lack of opportunities. However, when minorities surpass these
lower socio-economic barriers, become voters, and then run for public office, how will they
perform? I am now going well beyond the total reduced number of minority candidates in the
state legislature, and I am trying to ascertain the role that the cost of voting plays in the electoral
success of the minority candidates running.
More precisely, I measure whether a more restrictive state/institutional structure can help
me understand the lack the electoral success of minority candidates better. As in the whole
monograph, I begin by looking at bivariate relationships. In comparison with the state COVI
Ranks, intensity and movement are seen in the relationship between each of the three dependent
variables. I use COVI ranks as my main explanatory variable because it normalizes state outputs
over 25 years. I use the state rank in the presidential election cycle prior or concurrent with the
relevant statewide race in particular. Therefore, for elections in 2006, I used the state's 2004
COVI rankings. If the statewide election takes place at the same time as a presidential election, I
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use that year’s state COVI value. For example, I use Alabama’s 2008 state rank for the 2008
Alabama Senate election, between Jeff Sessions (R) and Vivian Davis Figures (D). During the
time period studied, I identified 182 minority candidates running as a representative of one of the
two main political parties in a state-wide race.3 The bivariate relations between the COVI Ranks
by state and the three measurements of election achievement are shown in the Table 1.
Table 1.
The Electoral Success of Minority Candidates Running for Statewide Offices
and COVI Rank: 1996-2020

COVI Rank
Won Office
Own Percent
Election Margin

COVI Rank
1
-.27 (p < .001)
n = 182
-.23 (p < .001)
n = 182
-.25 (p < .001)
n = 182

Won Office

Own Percent

Election Margin

1
.71 (p < .001)
n = 182
.77 (p < .001)
n = 182

1
.94 (p < .001)
n = 182

1

The three indicators for the election achievement of minority candidates are all negatively
associated to the COVI Rank in the first column of Table 1. In states with higher COVI rank,
minorities on average perform poorly. Costs of voting in states with the higher COVI Rank,
compared to other states, are higher. In other words, the electoral success of minority candidates
continues to diminish as the state rank increases to the 50th position. Moreover, given the three
measures, the statistical importance of the relationships cannot be denied. The bivariate relations
between the two dependent variables (Columns 2 and 3) indicate that they are not exactly the
same, so I really get three specific tests of the role played by COVI in depressing the electoral
success of minorities.

3

I do not include the 23 minority candidates who ran for Lieutenant Governor on the same ticket with a
gubernatorial candidate.
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Bivariate relationships are not the whole story, and I must control for other
considerations. In states with large minority populations, for example, I expect minority
candidates to perform better. I know that it is more likely that minority people, especially
African American voters, would support the Democratic Party. If the Republican Party is
represented by disproportionate amount of the minority candidates, I suspect this could make it
difficult to explain for Black candidates’ poor electoral performance. In addition, I will now
describe the modelling assumptions that I make and the operations or measurements for each of
the control variables.
Control Variables. The candidate's party is the first variable I control for. I mark this
consideration as Democrat and rate all candidates running for the statewide office of Democrats
with a "1" and Republicans with a "0." The research excludes the minority candidates from third
parties. I expect a positive correlation between being a Democratic Party candidate and electoral
success. In other words, on average, I expect minority Democrats to be given more electoral
support. In this case, though, it is important to recognize that in certain cases a Republican
minority candidate might be seen as less risky for the majority of white voters, which could
result in greater support for the candidate. This could be particularly true if the cost of voting is
kept constant, and I will look at the electoral process of a few minority Republican candidates in
detail.
Following that, I control for the extent of Electoral Competition. For instance, I am not
using a competitive electoral environment to determine the 'benefits' of voting. Rather, when
electoral races are tougher, I am concerned about how voters will not risk voting for a minority
candidate out of fear of wasting their vote. Previous research has shown that voters do not want
to "waste" their vote on candidates who have no fair chance of winning (McMurray,2015). If the
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average voter believes that a minority candidate is disadvantaged systematically and wants to
vote in favor of the eventual winner, they could choose the White candidate. I measure electoral
competition as the difference in voting percentages between the two major party candidates at
the top of the ticket (governor, senator, or president) in either the current or previous election
cycle. For odd-year statewide elections, I also use the previous election cycle value. For
example, in 2001, I used the competition at the top of the tickets in the 2000 Virginia
Presidential Election Cycle for Donald McEachin, a Black Democrat running for Attorney
General. I expect that a greater margin will be associated with more minority candidates help and
support, indicating lower election competitiveness. Lower competitiveness is therefore
equivalent to greater support of minority candidates and is predicted to produce a negative
coefficient in the regressions.
After that, I measure whether the minority candidate's gender has a bearing on electoral
success. This variable is labeled Female, and I anticipate that minority females would be
particularly disadvantaged. Although research shows that women are generally matching males if
they have a similar background and campaign resources (Thomsen and Swers 2017). I know that
in the area of socio-economic mobility, minority women are particularly disadvantaged. As a
result, there could be lower electoral support. If women in society as a whole are marginalized, it
is expected that it will be difficult for minority women to win statewide elected office. I expect
negative coefficients in the regression analyses once more.
The Percent Black Population and Percent Latinx Population are the fourth and fifth
control variables. I use the data of the U.S. Census Bureau in any case, using 1990 values for
election 1996-1999 along with 2000 census figures used for 2000-2004 elections. The 2005
population estimates were provided for election in 2005-2009. The 2010 values are used for
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elections from 2010-2013. Also, the 2014 values (population estimates) are used in the elections
from 2014-2018. The 2019 (population estimates) are used for the 2019-2020 elections. Table 2
shows the descriptive statistics for the three dependent variables, our main explanatory variable
(COVI Rank), and each of the control variables.
Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics of Variables used to Test Minority Candidate Electoral Success in
Statewide Races: 1996-2020

Dependent Variables
Won Office
Own Percent
Election Margin
Key Explanatory Variable
COVI Rank
Control Variables
Democrat
Electoral Competition
Female
Percent Black Population
Percent Latinx Population
n

Min. Value

Max. Value

Mean Value

Stnd. Dev.

0

1

.24

.43

-63.88

43.53

-11.06

19.02

2

50

28.66

13.06

0
.06
0
.5
.9

1
51.41
1
37.8
49.3

.77
14.55
.32
15.33
13.75

.42
9.45
.47
10.73
13.26

182

In light of the descriptive statistics, the mean value of .24 for the Won Office
consideration can be easily interpreted. In particular, the value suggests that the candidates from
minorities who run for a state-wide office, within the period studied, won approximately 24
percent of the time. That is 44 out of the 182 minority candidates won and 138 minority
candidates lost. Moving on to the third dependent variable, Election Margin, I learn that the
lowest value is obtained by Ed Lopez, a Latino Republican who lost the Secretary of State race
in Rhode Island in 1998, and the highest value is obtained by Jesse White, a Black Democrat
who easily won the 2010 Secretary of State race in Illinois. A COVI rank of “2” indicates that no
minority candidates ran for statewide office in a state that was rated as the easiest to vote in
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during the time span examined (usually Oregon). The variable's mean of .32 for Female shows
that approximately 32 percent (58/182) of minority candidates for state office during the course
of the study were women. I run three regression models, one for each of the three dependent
variables, using the variables in Table 2, and report the results in Table 3. The main concern was
the relative cost of voting or the restrictiveness of the electoral environment in each state.
Table 3.
Minority Electoral Success when Running for Statewide Office and the COVI
Models: Logit Regression/Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)Regression/OLS Regression
Won Office
Own Percent
Election Margin
Key Explanatory Variable
Coefficient (s.e.)
Coefficient (s.e.) Coefficient (s.e.)
COVI Rank
-.053 (.019) *
-.227 (.080) *
-.454 (.158) *
Control Variables
Democrat
Electoral Competition
Female
Percent Black Population
Percent Latinx Population

.939 (.592)
-.004 (.020)
-.215 (.620)
-.013 (.025)
.016 (.017)

Constant
-.43 (.66)
Wald Chi2/F-Statistic/F-Statistic
10.39 *
2 2 2
Pseudo R /R /R
.10
N
182
* p < .05 (two-tailed test); t p < .05 (one-tailed test)

5.233 (2.633) *
-.222 (.077) *
.373 (1.986)
-.014 (.097)
.113 (.060) t

9.502 (4.649) *
-.397 (.145) *
-2.126 (3.835)
.002 (.161)
.220 (.113) t

47.53 (3.09) *
2.99 *
.16
182

-1.98 (5.90)
3.13 *
.16
182

Taking the "Won Office" model into account, findings in the first column shows that the
COVI rank is statistically associated with the fact that the minority candidate has actually won a
state-wide election. However, after testing the state electoral climate, the test of whether the
minority candidate was a Democrat and the test of state electoral competition climate both show
signs in the hypothesized correct direction that are not statistically significant. The following two
models statistically relates all variables to the electoral minority achievement. I am therefore
pleased to say that all these considerations are significant.
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The significance of the COVI as a whole amazed me at this stage. According to the logit
coefficient, the chance of a minority candidate winning in a 2nd-ranked state is higher than 58 %.
In a state ranked 50th, this chance drops to a little more than 4%. During the time span analyzed,
a standard deviation in COVI Rank was about 13 places. To further highlight the statistical
importance of COVI Ranks, consider a decrease from 12th to 25th position in state ranks. In this
case, the chances of winning are reduced from approximately 46 percent to 30 percent. I think
the lack of electoral success for minorities and consequently descriptive representation is a very
meaningful and significant reason.
With regards to the other two models, as noted, I now have some proof that being a
Democrat benefits a candidate who is a minority on average. More importantly, minority
candidates perform worse in statewide elections when the Electoral Competition in a state is
higher. According to one explanation of this result, voters are less inclined to support a minority
candidate if they believe their vote would be “wasted”. In accordance with Racial Threat Theory,
White voters could be more inclined to vote for a minority candidate in a race where the minority
candidate has a lower chance of winning, in part because the state has fewer two-party electoral
competition.
In 2002, a Black Democrat named Stephen Benjamin ran for Attorney General in South
Carolina and earned a higher percentage of the state’s vote than Al Gore won in the South
Carolina presidential election in 2000. The number of votes of Benjamin were 2.63% higher than
Gore. South Carolina is deemed as a Republican Party stronghold, and a vote for a minority
Democrat can seem less concerning to majority White voters because they know he would not
win. In fact, he does lose. Another example is former football player Damon Dunn, a Black
Republican who ran in for California Secretary of State in 2010, surpassed the 2008 presidential
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California performance of John McCain. Dunn was not a danger in winning in a Democratic
Party stronghold, but he outperformed his political party in the state. Moreover, I will better
understand why minorities perform worse in states where elections are closer on average if these
events are systemic. Using the COVI Rank test and minority candidates' Own Percentage, I
obtain a coefficient of .227. Remember, the COVI Rank has one standard deviation of about 13
units. With a one standard deviation shift in state rank, multiplying the coefficient by 13 predicts
a 3% decrease in electoral support. The full spectrum of COVI Rank can account for around an
11% drop-in support for minority candidates (.227 * 49), which is clearly significant enough to
warrant a difference between winning and losing.
The electoral margin coefficient is equivalent to -454. Now, a one-standard decline in
COVI Rank has led to an increase in the electoral margin of nearly six percent (- 454 * 13).
Take, for example, Marquita Bradshaw's 2020 Senate run in Tennessee. The Democratic Party's
candidate was defeated by Bill Haggerty(R) by a margin of 27.3%. Tennessee was ranked 46th
or had the 46th most restrictive electoral climate in 2020. North Carolina was ranked 33rd in
2020 and was one standard deviation higher than Tennessee. Yvonne Lewis Holley, another
Black Democrat, who ran for Lieutenant Governor received just 3.26% of the vote. According to
this study, the difference in COVI rankings between Tennessee and North Carolina can account
for around 6% of the difference in the electoral performance of the two Black females running
for statewide office in 2020.
Scenarios of Minorities Performance
I now turn to the underrepresentation of minorities and women in state legislatures,
testing if the COVI can help us better understand variation in the demographic representation of
these subpopulations. Black and Latino populations have been underrepresented within
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American politics ever since black men got the right to vote with the passing of the 15th
Amendment in 1860s. At no time in American history that Blacks and Latinos have ever been
given representation in public offices, equal to the members in the population. Yet, we know that
there are Blacks and Latinos who have won state-wide office. For instance, Barack Obama was
elected State Senator for Illinois. Bill Richardson became the Governor of New Mexico. So, this
research attempts to better understand why under certain circumstances do Black and Latino
politicians win, but often they lose. Why are Black and Latinos underrepresented? Does the
restrictiveness of each state’s electoral/institutional climate help explain the relative
underrepresentation of minorities in government?
Well, underrepresentation of Blacks and Latinos means that they are more likely to be
persecuted. Blacks and Latinos throughout American history have been met with discrimination
and are disadvantaged. Racial discrimination has created barriers and obstacles that does much
harm than good for them. It has not only been used by individual against Blacks and Latinos, but
it has also been embedded into our institutions. They tend to lack in certain areas that other
groups have more of. In looking at the discrimination that Blacks and Latinos face, these two
ethic and racial groups within our American population have lacked resources in areas such as in
housing, education, and healthcare. Most importantly, the constant bias that blacks and Latinos
endure makes it even harder for individuals apart of this groups. The constant negative attitudes
towards Blacks and Latinos have also endured the brutal attacks from our criminal justice system
that continuously mistreats them. Mass incarceration has caused a lot of Blacks and Latinos to be
barred from voting making them disenfranchised.
So, when looking at Blacks and Latinos who run for statewide office, what is it to say
that they too have experience these types of discrimination and biases that Blacks and Latinos
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voters experience daily. It is to this point that the certain circumstances that Blacks and Latinos
have been put under can have a lasting effect on Black and Latino within the political arena
statewide. There are Black and Latinos that have overperformed in statewide election, but there
are some that underperform in them as well. This research is essential to see how Black and
Latino politicians who do run in states that make it harder to vote are met with challenges,
whether they win or lose. Moreover, I know that some states are more restrictive than other states
that make it easier for individuals to vote in. So, I expect that Black and Latinos will get more
votes or do well if they have a good education. Most importantly, we expect that Blacks and
Latinos will do well if they have previous experience in political office.
Furthermore, the state of Illinois is one of the states that makes it easier for individuals to
vote in. Based on Cost of Voting Index (COVI), Illinois in the considered to be a less restrictive
state because Illinois is progressive. In 2004, Barack Obama won the Democratic elections for
US. Senate for Illinois. He was an Illinois state senator in 1996 before becoming U.S. Senator
(Drupal, 2018). He also was very educated and had a lot of experience in working within the
Chicago community. He studied at Columbia University in New York City, majoring in Political
Science for his undergraduate degree in 1991 (Drupal, 2018). After graduating from Columbia
University, he spent some time in Chicago helping disadvantaged poor people on the South side
of Chicago (Drupal, 2018). He helped to restore the living condition of those poor resident as
well. Barack Obama graduated Harvard Law School with “magna cum laude” and “became the
first Black student to become the “president of the Harvard Law Review” from 19901991(Drupal, 2018). After looking at his background, Obama in 2004 outperformed his own
party in the previous president election by 14.49 percent, garnishing 70 percent in the votes in
Illinois.
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When a Democratic candidate ran in a state that was harder to vote in, we see a different
outcome. In 2018, Stacey Abrams ran in the Georgia gubernatorial election against Republican
candidate Brian Kemp and lost (ballotpedia.org, n.d). Based on COVI, Georgia is one of the few
states that is more restrictive, with a COVI ranking of 38 in 2018. Abrams was able to get over
48.8 percent of the votes, which she outperforms her own party by 1.46 percent. It is very
interesting to see how Abrams lost in the General elections even though she had more education
and held multiple political positions. Stacey Abrams received her bachelor’s degree at Spellman,
an all-female HBCU in 1995(ballotpedia.org). She also got her graduate degree at the University
of Texas, Austin in 1998 and her law degree at Yale Law School in 1999(ballotpedia.org, n.d).
Prior to running for Governor, Stacey was elected Georgia House of Representative of District
89 in 2007 to 2017(ballotpedia.org, n.d). When Abrams saw that there was a significant number
of mismanaged votes from the Secretary of State in Georgia, Abrams started the “fairfight” to
make sure that all eligible voters were able to vote (Fair Fight, n.d). Democratic typically do not
do well in the state of Georgia and it is a conservative state that Republican win. It is very clear
based on this data presented that the state of Georgia residents is underrepresented because there
is over 30.7 percent of Blacks in the state of Georgia and Abrams only got 48.8 percent of the
votes during the 2018 elections.
There have been individuals that have won in states that are restrictive. In 2002, Bill
Richardson won in the gubernational election in New Mexico. In 2002 he outperformed his own
party that ran in that state in 2000 by 5.47 percent, receiving 55.5 percent of the votes in New
Mexico. Even though Bill Richardson won in a state that is restrictive according to COVI, he is a
popular person on all levels in government. Bill Richardson held numerous amounts of political
position prior to becoming the Governor of New Mexico. Richardson was a U.S senator from
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1982 to 1996(Bill Richardson, n.d). He held distinguished political position serving as the United
States Ambassador to the United Nations and Secretary of Energy under Bill Clinton in 1998 to
2000(Bill Richardson, n.d). He received his bachelor’s degree at Tufts University in 1970 as well
as his J.D. at Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1971(ballotpedia.org,
n.d).
Additionally, in looking at how Black and Latino Republican candidate perform in states
that are restrictive. In 2015, Jenean Hampton was elected the 57th Republican Lieutenant
Governor of Kentucky, being the first African American women to do so (ballotpedia.org, n.d).
The gubernational candidate that Hampton ran on a joint ticket with was Matt Bevin. Hampton
had a good education instead of having experience in a political office. Hampton received her
bachelor’s degree in science, studying industrial engineering from Wayne State University in
1985(ballotpedia.org, n.d). She later received her M.B.A. at the University of Rochester
(ballotpedia.org, n.d). Hampton also served in the United States Air Force for over seven years
(ballotpedia.org, n.d). This is the first political position she has held and has more experience in
managing packaging companies (ballotpedia.org, n.d). But she was able to get 52.5 percent of
the votes in Kentucky compared to her party’s performance during the presidential election in
2012, where Mitch McConnell received 61.54 percent of the votes. So, she underperformed in
her party by -9.04 percent.
So, when Republican go to states that are easier to vote in, we see a different outcome. In
2004 Randy Brock Randy ran in elections for Comptroller in Vermont and won. Brock
outperformed his party in this state in receiving 52.1 percent compared to the 34.81 percent in
Vermont. The state of Vermont is an easier state to vote in and is ranked number 9 on the COVI
scale as less restrictive. Brock had a good education and experience in He received his bachelor's
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degree at Middlebury College and later received his master’s degree from Yale University
(Vermont General Assembly, n.d). Brock served in the United States Army as a Captain of the
Military Corps and fought in the Vietnam War (Vermont General Assembly, n.d).
Finally, in 2019, Ralph Alvarado ran for lieutenant governor of Kentucky and lost in the
general elections. Alvarado did not perform well in Kentucky, only getting 48.6 percent of the
votes in 2015 compared to the 61.54 percent that his party got during the presidential election
back in 2012. Alvarado earned his bachelor’s degree in biology as well as his Medical degree in
internal medicine and pediatrics from Loma Linda University in California (ballotpedia.org, n.d).
He also did his residency at the University of Kentucky (ballotpedia.org, n.d). Alvarado has
served as a state senator of Kentucky in 2014 as well (ballotpedia.org, n.d). He also was on many
medical commission boards and was elected the first Hispanic to serve on Kentucky state
General Assembly.
The Underrepresentation of Minorities and Women in State Legislatures
In particular, I wanted to know if higher COVI values, which indicate a more restricted
state electoral climate, would lead to underperformance by minority candidates for state office.
Since I only have one COVI value for each state in each of the seven election cycles, I
concentrated on statewide races. Furthermore, I am aware that in some states, the establishment
of majority-minority districts greatly enhances the likelihood of minority representation. But
what about minority representation in state legislatures as a whole? Is it possible that certain
states will support majority-minority districts more than others, and/or that certain states will use
this approach to maximize minority votes in one district while reducing minority voting capacity
in adjacent or neighboring districts? In either case, I am interested in knowing whether states
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with higher COVI values have more or less minority representation within state legislatures. I
could also look into the demographics of women in state legislatures to test this.
To rephrase the research question, do higher COVI values, indicating a more restrictive
state electoral climate, result in fewer minority and female state legislative seats? Although I
have not generally looked at gender, here I have examined if there are fewer women in the state
legislatures when the cost of voting in a state is higher, since the data are widely available. Also,
this is yet another category which is underrepresented in political positions in the United States.
Racial Threat Theory's rationale, which leads to higher COVI values and demobilization of
minorities, could actively harm women. I focus on the underrepresentation of minorities and
women in 2021 and use the 2020 COVI values as my primary variable.
Since I conducted my tests in a single year, raw COVI values compared to the COVI rank
are now sufficient for standardized COVI values for multi-election cycling tests. Once again, I
try to analyze it in many ways to ensure that my results are not just the outcome of a specific
strategic measurement. First, I measure the gap between the percentage in the minority of each
state and the percentage of women in state legislatures in those groupings. In Mississippi, for
example, the 2019 Census Bureau population estimates about 37.8 percent of state residents
identifying as Black or African American. In 2021, Blacks held just 31.03 percent of the seats in
the state legislature (40/122 in the House and 14/52 in the Senate). So, Mississippi has a 6.77 %
gap in black representation. Can the COVI help us better understand these state gaps,
systematically?
The following figures show the results for each subpopulation I consider. Please keep in
mind that the difference in representation of African Americans with the COVI values in 2021
has been strongly positive in Figure 1. This relation is statistically relevant and shows that, in
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states with higher COVI values, blacks on average are mainly under-represented. It can also be
seen in the figure that there are eight American states where Black people in state legislatures are
overrepresented. The 8 states are all under the horizontal line zero (0) are, Colorado, Illinois,
Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington. Notably, on average, six of the
eight states have negative COVI values or make voting less restrictive. On the other hand, Blacks
are underrepresented in the other 42 state legislatures. Arkansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, and
Mississippi have more than a 5% gap. Massachusetts has a negative COVI value among those
four states and remaining three states are more difficult to vote in.

Figure 1. The 2020 COVI and the Gap between % Blacks in State Legislatures and State
Black Populations in 2021
Considering the gap in Latinx representation, in Figure 1, I notice that all states are above
the zero-horizontal line (0). In other words, there are no States with over-represented Latinx
populations in a state legislature. The closest State is West Virginia, where only 1.7% of the
citizens of the state identify as Latin American or Hispanic. About 1.49% of the state legislators
(2 out of 134 total legislators) identified as Latin American or Hispanic. Particularly, West
Virginia is a conservative state that has voted for the Republican Party presidential nominee in
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each of the last six presidential election cycles (2000-2020), but has a negative COVI value in
2020, meaning it does have a more inclusive state electoral/institutional climate.

Figure 2. The 2020 COVI and the Gap between % Latinx in State Legislature and State
Latinx Population in 2021

In general, there is no connection between COVI values and the Latinx representation
gap. This is undeniably clarified in part by the variation in the size of state Latinx populations. In
2019, the proportion of Latinx people in each state ranges from 1.7% in West Virginia to 49.3%
in New Mexico. In addition, 39.4 percent of the population in California, which is one of the
easiest states to vote in, identifies as Latinx. Despite the fact that the state legislature is tiny, with
just 120 seats, 33 Latinx state legislators make up 27.5 percent of the two chambers (22/80 in the
state House and 11/40 in the state Senate). According to the data, there is nearly a 12-percentagepoint difference (39.4 – 27.5) in representation in the state ranked sixth easiest to vote in during
the 2020 election cycle. This result by itself indicates that it could be harder to close the Latinx
representation gap in States with larger populations, regardless of cost of voting. Furthermore, I
will exclude states with the greatest population of Latinx in order to get a better understanding of
how higher costs voting compromise Latinx representation. However, as seen in Figure 2, the
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state of Texas does meet the expectations. It holds the largest gap, which is has one of the higher
COVI values in 2020.
In addressing the proportion of women's representation in state legislatures, as shown in
Figure 3, I noticed the same trend as for African Americans. Again, a statistically relevant
positive correlation is evident. In other words, the gap in the representation of women is growing
as COVI values become positive. It is interesting to know that only one state within the Union
has women overrepresented in a state legislature—Nevada. In 2021, 37 out of 63 in
Nevada’s state legislators (27/42 House and 10/21 Senate) were women. In addition, in
Colorado, Maine, Oregon, Rhode Island and Washington the representation gap is less than 10
percent, which makes voting easier on average. States like Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee,
South Carolina, and Wyoming, which make it difficult to vote in, have among the largest gap of
representation for females.

Figure 3. The 2020 COVI and Gap between the Percent Females in State Legislature and
State Female Population in 2021
The scatterplots are interesting and tell an important story. However, I also want to look
at the effect the cost of voting has on the raw number of representatives in state legislature when
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I control for the size of minority and female population size in each state. I use the proportional
size of the Black, Latinx, and Female delegation in each legislature in 2021. I combine the
representatives from the two chambers, add the two chamber sizes, and do the division to obtain
the proportion of each group and then multiple by 100 to obtain % Black Legislators, % Latinx
Legislators, and %Female Legislators. These become my three dependent variables. My key
explanatory variable is each state’s 2020 COVI value. I use the U.S. Census Bureau's 2019
population estimates for each group as an important control variable. I expect that as the state's
Black Population and Latinx Population rises as a percentage of all state residents, so will their
representation in the state legislature. Although there are some variations in female populations,
I do not foresee enough variation to establish a statistically significant relation in this case.4
In these models, I also account for the Squire Index, a measure of legislative
professionalism. Since I am just doing a cross-sectional analysis and not comparing it over time,
I can use the raw index values in this case. Greater legislative professionalism is correlated with
higher raw scores. I therefore expect a more positive association and a better representation of
minorities and women. I use Squire Index values for 2015 in particular (Squire 2017). As a
substitute or surrogate for the state culture, I have used legislative professionalism. Regardless of
the cost of voting, I assume that more elite-led amateur legislatures would have less minorities
and women. I learned that more traditional state cultures, indicated by higher Squire Index ranks,
help explain COVI values. So, to ensure that the COVI does not pick up any of the explanatory
power of legislative professionalism, I include this variable in the models.
According to the findings in Table 4, the COVI is statistically relevant in both the African
American and Female models. I obtain a coefficient of -.736 in the first model, which examines

4

The state, in 2019, with the largest female population is Alabama where 51.7% of residents are women and the
state with the lowest percentage of women is Alaska with 47.9%.
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the impact of the cost of voting on Black representation in state legislatures. The COVI range for
2020 is between -2.92 to -1.44 or 4.36. Taking that into account, I see a decrease of more than 3
percent of the Black representation in the entire COVI range. The decline for females (Column
3) is slightly more than one percent (-.251 * 4.36). However, when I look at the central model
that tries to clarify the representation of Latinx in state legislatures, COVI does not affect or
depress the percentage of Latinx state legislators. The sizes of the African American and Latin
American population of each state explains a significant difference in the representation of
legislators from each group. For example, these states are not electing minority lawmakers, in
states like Maine, Vermont or Wyoming, where minority populations are very little. Other
states with higher minority populations have a higher percentage of minorities in the state
legislature as predicted.
Table 4.
The 2020 COVI and the Percentage of Minorities and Female State Legislators in 2021
Model: Ordinary Least Squares Regression
% African American
Legislators
Coefficient (s.e.)
2020 COVI
-.736 (.342) *

% Latinx
Legislators
Coefficient (s.e.)
.637 (.458)

% Female
Legislators
Coefficient (s.e.)
-.251 (.099) *

Black Population
Latinx Population
Female Population

.895 (.230) *

Squire Index

.251 (2.927)

.690 (4.085)

2.344 (13.799)

-.641 (.754)
305.53 *
.95
50

-4.280 (.996) *
158.11 *
.91
50

79.854 (82.664)
3.13
.12
50

Constant
F-Statistic
Adjusted R2
N
* p < .05 (two-tailed test)

.806 (.039) *
-.849 (1.657)

It is important to note that the two minority groups are treated separately in this study.
There are states such as California and New Mexico that have larger Latinx population but
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were far below the average African American populations. Other states such as Mississippi and
Louisiana have relatively large populations of African Americans but very small populations
within Latinx communities. The control variables return coefficients that are very high in
comparison to the standard error (s.e.), implying a very close match or association between the
population variables and the percent of legislators from each group. The Squire Index of
legislative professionalism always returns a positive association, as expected, but it is not
statistically significant. In looking at a simple bivariate relationship between the Squire index
and my three dependent variables, it appears that there are more minorities and women in state
legislatures with above-average professionalism ratings. The bivariate relationship is
approaching statistical significance in the case of females, and it is statistically important in the
case of Latinx in state legislatures (Pearson R =.28 p.05, two-tailed, n = 50).
In order to further examine the relationship between COVI 2020 and Latin Americans
and Hispanics in state legislatures, I exclude the relatively large Latinx populations. Over the last
few decades, the growth of the Latinx community in the United states has been substantial
(Passel, Cohn, and Lopez, 2011). A number of states have received a large number of new
residents from Latin American countries, possibly because they were welcoming or even because
there were more jobs. The Latinx population is much higher than normal and has grown even
more recently in states like Colorado and Nevada. Latinx representation in these state
legislatures, presumably, has not yet caught up. This may be particularly the case as a result of a
delay in citizenship and the possibility of running for election. When I consider all 50 American
states, states like Colorado and Nevada, which have both lower-than-average COVI values in
2020 and fewer Latinx state legislators, prevent the statistically negative relationship from
materializing. But what if I consider a subset of states? When examining the inter-state
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distribution of the Latinx population, a natural break occurs at 15%. Also, 38 states have less
than 15% Latinx people and 12 states have more. I then examine the COVI's potential role in the
38 states where Latinx are a "truer" minority community.
The results are shown in Table 5. If I were given a one-tailed statistical test, the COVI
2020 it would now be negatively linked to the percentage of state legislative seats that Latinx
people occupy. The entire COVI 2020 range is -1.44 (Oregon) - 2.91 (New Hampshire) or
approximately 4.35. The 38 states with less than 15 percent of Latinx population are Oregon and
New Hampshire. The 2020 COVI test as stated in Table 5 yields a factor of -.395. This means
that, on average, New Hampshire is expected to have approximately 2% fewer Latinx
representatives within their state legislature than Oregon (-395 * 4.35), all the rest being
equivalent. Furthermore, the Squire Index is now statistically related to higher representation in
Latin American and Hispanic representation in state legislatures around the board and states with
higher Latinx populations, and also has a large number of Latinx lawmakers in the state
legislatures.
Table 5.
The Percentage of Latinx State Legislators and the COVI in 2021:
State Population Less than 15 Percent of the Total
Model: Ordinary Least Squares Regression
% Latinx
Legislators
Coefficient (s.e.)
2020 COVI
-.395 (.228) t
Latinx Population

.215 (.058) *

Squire Index

4.448 (2.152) *

Constant
F-Statistic
Adjusted R2
N

-.646 (.636)
14.03
.51
50
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* p < .05 (two-tailed test); t p < .05 (one-tailed test)
Conclusion
In general, I searched for explanations for the increase in state election restrictions. I
discovered that the role of Republican Party (GOP) control of the state legislature was not as
obvious as first. In both chambers of State legislatures, there are some states (Montana, North
Dakota, and Utah) with a comfortable Republican majority that are not on average correlated
with increased electoral restrictions during the course of the study. However, I notice more
restrictions when I combine GOP influence over state electoral laws within black communities
and in the increasing Latinx community. I suspect certain variations of the Racial Threat
Theory may clarify this finding. I found it, especially for Latin American and Asian Americans
where barriers between language and culture are more evident. However, I have learned that in
states where the Black population is rising the fastest, GOP control of the state legislature and
being Black both serve to reduce reported voter turnout. In this report, I expand the review to
explore the impact of COVI on minority candidates running for state offices, while also testing
the gap in representation of state legislators of minorities and women. I have also found that the
electoral climate has become more conservative in order to reduce the representation of these
particularly underrepresented groups.
I evaluate the electoral performance of minority’s candidates in three ways, and I found a
more restrictive state electoral climates associated with lower minority electoral success.
Moreover, not only is the decline in the likelihood of winning important statistically, but it is also
really significant. Moving from the most difficult state to vote in to the easiest to state vote
in, reduces the likelihood of winning from approximately 58 to 4 percent, according to this study.
I also learn that in states with more conservative voting laws the representation deficit in the state
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legislatures is wider, given that the state's population is less than 15% Latinx. Moreover, in a
more restrictive electoral climate, I see that the representativeness gap for female representatives
is even greater, and this is the case with state legislative professionalism, which allows others to
understand the proportionate representation of women and minorities in state legislatures.
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